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Abstract
In this paper we compare two policy instruments that can be adopted to curb carbon emissions.
The rst is a conventional pollution tax. The second is an environmental campaign aiming to
inuence consumers to switch to a green good. We consider two di¤erent scenarios. When
consumers are characterized by hedonic quality preferences, in this case the pollution tax is more
e¢ cient than the campaign. On the contrary, when consumers develop environmental quality
preferences, there are cases in which the campaign is preferred. To sum up, while both policy
instruments are e¤ective in reducing pollution emissions, their e¢ ciency viewed from a welfare
perspective crucially depends on consumersenvironmental awareness.
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1 Introduction
Environmental protection is one of the most important issues on the agenda for policy-makers and
governments across the globe. In particular, the debate has focused on which tool should be adopted
to convince rms to reduce the level of polluting emissions. The conventional instrument, a tax
proportional to level of pollution, has been often criticized, on the ground that it is very di¢ cult
to measure the exact damage produced by each rm. Likewise, other alternative tools have been
proposed, and policies have been suggested. In the European Union, the creation of a market for the
exchange of polluting permits has been considered as an e¢ cient solution, but it relies on the fact
that a certain level of pollution is not only accepted, but also supported.
Many commentators claim that educating citizens/consumers to respect the environment may
prove to be a very e¤ective instrument, as it rewards green rms to the detriment of brown rms.
A recent example of informative policies in the EU includes the Italian guidelines on CO2 emission
savings.1 The document ranks vehicles according to their environmental impact. In the US, a similar
initiative, the EPA Smart Way program, compares environmental performance of vehicles.2 The
main question is therefore: how do consumers react to such initiatives? Are they really willing to
switch to a green good, even if the pure satisfaction from its consumption is lower than that of a
brown good? Electric cars, for example, still have not reached a level of performance comparable to
that of traditional combustible vehicles. Depending on whether consumers value the intrinsic quality
of the engine more than its environmental impact, such a policy may have a di¤erent impact on
inuencing consumerschoice. This is what we want to capture in our paper.
We adopt a model of vertical di¤erentiation where two rms compete by setting prices. As usual,
rms di¤erentiate their products in quality as a way to mitigate competition and increase prots
(Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). However, in our paper one of the two
rms produces the green good and pays an additional cost for it. The other produces a polluting
good, and may be subject to environmental taxation.
Following our preliminary discussion, we consider two di¤erent scenarios, depending on whether
consumers perceive the quality of the product as being dependant on the pure performance (hedonic
quality) or on the emission of pollution (environmental quality). In the rst case, the high quality
good is the one that pollutes, while in the second case the opposite holds. This will have a signicant
impact on the fundamental assumptions on which the theoretical model is based.
In each scenario, we build a two-stage game where the government intervenes in the rst stage by
either taxing the polluting rm, or by indirectly rewarding the green rm through an environmental
campaign. In the second stage, rms compete by setting prices. A crucial point of our model is
that the campaign is designed in order to stigmatize pollution. In particular, its nal aim is to
persuade consumers to attach a positive value to the green good, therefore directing consumers
1The Italian guidelines are a joint e¤ort between the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment and the Ministry of Environment. For further details visit www.mit.gov.it/mit/site.php?p=cm&o=vd&id=2724.
2Visit www.epa.gov/smartway/basic-info/index.htm for further details.
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preferences towards that good. The main implication is an increase of its demand at the expense
of the consumption of the brown good. This is captured by resorting to the theory of relative
preferences, recently developed by Ghazzai (2008) and Alexopoulos and Sapp (2006), inter alii.3
Our main results are as follows. When consumer preferences favour hedonic quality, taxation
prevails as the best policy instrument to achieve the highest level of social welfare. The environmental
campaign is too costly, and it only indirectly a¤ects rmsprots. However, consumer surplus shrinks,
as taxation reduces total output. On the contrary, when consumers value the environmental quality
of the good, then an environmental campaign may be more e¢ cient than the pollution tax, provided
that its cost is not excessive, and that the green expansive e¤ect generated by the campaign is
su¢ ciently high. As we will explain in the paper, such an e¤ect positively depends on the average
willingness to pay for the environmental quality. However, if the campaign exceeds a certain level
of cost, then taxation is preferred. We will also highlight the ambiguous role of the environmental
emission parameter: a relatively high emission level can favour the adoption of the campaign if its
cost is contained, otherwise the opposite may occur.
The main message of our contribution can therefore be summarized as follows. An environmental
campaign based on relative preferences is less e¢ cient than a traditional taxation instrument, as long
as consumers are environmentally unconcerned. Things change however with green consumerism, in
which case the environmental campaign can be welfare improving with respect to environmental
taxation. Our model can thus provide valuable environmental policy indications, depending on
region-specic consumers preferences.
As recent studies have shown, environmental concern varies across countries as well as over time
due to socio-economic conditions. Kahn and Kotchen (2010) point out that in the last few years
the US has experienced substantial erosion in public concern about environmental issues because of
the chilling e¤ect of recession. Based on national surveys, they have found a correlation between
the unemployment rate and the relevance of global warming. Another example is provided by an
European survey conducted between April and May 2011 on citizensattitude towards the environ-
ment (Special Eurobarometer 365).4 The result showed that most EU citizens feel that protecting
the environment is important to them and that environmental problems have a direct impact on
their everyday lives. Moreover, they are inclined also to play a part in protecting the environment
and they consider that actions to protect the environment should be carried out at a European level.
These two studies suggest therefore that di¤erent levels of environmental concern may depend on
socio-economic conditions as well as government engagement.
Literature review
Our paper is related to the literature on optimal tax policy with environmental quality. Among
3Since the seminal work of Leibenstein (1950), economists have aknowledged the importance of social factors in
consumption decisions. Akerlof (1997) has showed that consumer satisfaction increases in proportion to the di¤erence
between social classes.
4For more details, visit: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pdf/EB_summary_EB752.pdf
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others, Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (2002), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and Deltas et al.
(2013) study how green consumerism may a¤ect the supply of environmental quality in a di¤er-
entiated duopoly. In particular, Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) compare some fre-
quently used environmental policies: emissions standard, ad valorem tax and technology subsidiza-
tion. Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) analyses the combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an
emission tax (or a subsidy to consumers buying green products). While these two papers consider
a model of vertical di¤erentiation, Deltas et al. (2013) develop a duopoly where products di¤er
both vertically (in terms of their greenness) and horizontally (e.g., design, style, brand, and conve-
nience). They examine the choice of greenness and the implications of various policy interventions:
a tax on a polluting attribute of the products, a cost-sharing of development costs for improving the
greenness of a rms product and a minimum quality standard. By introducing an alternative instru-
ment like the campaign, our paper broadens the scope for government intervention. In a recent book,
Lambertini (2013, Ch. 6) provides a careful discussion about the possibility that environmentally
aware consumers may regulate rms behaviour even in absence of an explicit policy measure. We
complement this stream of research by endogenizing a policy intervention which makes consumers
aware of the damage.
The idea of an environmental campaign as an alternative policy instrument has been recently
analyzed in other contributions. Our framework is somewhat similar to Ben Elhadj et al. (2013), in
particular with respect to the idea of an environmental policy that a¤ects consumerspreferences. In
a vertically di¤erentiated model, they show that the presence of relative preferences for environmental
quality reduces pollution damage as it induces the polluting rm to increase its environmental quality.
Namely, they analyze how quality competition is a¤ected in the presence of relative preferences for
environmental quality and provide a rst suggestion for the use of new environmental policy tools.
While we do not analyze quality competition, we depart from Ben Elhadj et al. (2013) in what our
aim is the comparison of di¤erent environmental policies and how the desirability of such policies
may depend on the degree of consumersenvironmental concern (hedonic vs. environmental quali-
ties). Sartzetakis et al. (2012) analyze the role of information provision about goods environmental
damages as a policy instrument that supplements environmental taxation. They consider a dynamic
framework and show that as the accumulated stock of information increases, the optimal tax rate
declines over time. The information campaign in their model is always an e¢ cient complementary
policy because it reduces the asymmetry of information between consumers and manufacturers. Mit-
tnik et al. (2013) develop a growth model and point out how, for long term results, climate policies
should encourage and implement structural change of the economy changing the demand structure.
They claim that preferences shape the nal demand and hence the CO2 emissions of the economy.
These papers thus support environmental campaign as a policy instrument to supplement and/or
substitute traditional environmental policies. In our paper, we contribute by assessing the e¢ ciency
of such policies depending on consumersenvironmental concern.
Last but not least, our theoretical conclusions are somewhat in line with Garcia-Gallego and
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Georgantzis (2009). Here the authors consider a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly with heterogenous
consumers where the quality choice of the rms captures simultaneously their degree of corporate so-
cial responsibility and their environmental quality. They study the e¤ects of an increase in consumers
willingness to pay, which represents a higher social consciousness on the market equilibrium. Their
main result is that shifting towards socially responsible consumer preferences is in most cases welfare-
improving. However, it can be welfare-reducing when such an increase changes the market structure.
Hence, they obtain ambiguous conclusions about the e¢ ciency of environmental campaigns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the case with hedonic
qualities, while Section 3 deals with environmental qualities. Section 4 summarizes our main results
and discusses the assumptions of our model. Section 5 provides our concluding remarks.
2 Hedonic qualities
Consider two goods of di¤erent qualities: good H produced by rm H is the high quality good,
while good L produced by rm L is the low quality good. These goods are vertically di¤erentiated
in the traditional sense. Consumers agree that good H has a higher intrinsic quality than good L.
According to the denition of vertical di¤erentiation, they would all buy good H if they were sold at
the same price. We assume that there is a continuum of consumers indexed by  which is uniformly
distributed in the interval [0; b]. Thus,  measures consumersvaluation of quality. Parameter b > 0
measures consumers heterogeneity as well as the average valuation of the hedonic quality in the
market. Each consumer can buy either one unit of good H or one unit of good L or not buy anything
at all.
In this initial scenario consumers are environmentally unconcerned. The high quality good has a
higher performance than the low quality good but it emits pollution. It represents therefore the brown
good. The low quality good is emission-free and it is therefore considered as a green good. Pollution
creates an environmental damage D that reduces social welfare. Such a damage is proportional to
the emission released by the brown rm: D = e  xH , where xH is the quantity produced by rm H.
Parameter e > 0 captures the marginal social cost associated to pollution. The government has two
alternative policy instruments at its disposal: either a tax t proportional to the polluting emission,
or a campaign designed to raise environmental awareness.
We develop the following two-stage game: rst, the policy maker decides whether to intervene
and which policy instrument to use to reduce the environmental damage for any given level of the
per-unit emissions; second, rms compete in prices. We solve the game by backward induction.
More precisely, in the following, we solve the price competition stage for the two cases (taxation and
campaign) and then make the proper comparison to solve the policy maker decision.
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2.1 Taxing the polluting good
Consumer of type  2 [0; b] has the following utility:
U () =
8<:
qH   pH , if she buys the high quality good,
qL   pL, if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
The hedonic qualities of the two goods are indicated by qH > qL; pH and pL denotes the prices of
the high and the low quality goods, respectively. Parameter  measures the consumers willingness
to pay for hedonic quality. Notice that the above utility function does not account for the presence
of pollution. As usual, the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not
buying at all is:
L =
pL
qL
The consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high quality good is
instead:
H =
pH   pL
qH   qL
Demands are then given by xL = H   L and xH = b   H .5 As for the cost specication, we
assume that producing the green good requires a constant marginal cost c > 0, whereas the brown
quality is produced at zero cost. Nonetheless, the polluting good is subject to a per-unit tax t. Thus,
t can be interpreted as the tax di¤erential between the two rms, while c represents the marginal
production cost di¤erential.6 Prot functions are therefore given by:
L = (pL   c)xL;
H = (pH   t)xH :
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve the price competition stage and derive the main
results, which are valid for each quality conguration.7 Using F.O.C.s, equilibrium prices as a
function of qualities are:
pL =
qLb (qH   qL) + tqL + 2cqH
4qH   qL ;
pH =
qH [2b (qH   qL) + 2t+ c]
4qH   qL :
Let us now dene:
bmin  c (2qH   qL)
qL (qH   qL) ; (1)
tmax  qH [2b (qH   qL) + c]
(2qH   qL) (2)
5Note that at equilibrium the market is always uncovered because the consumer of type  = 0 always gets a
non-positive utility from buying either good.
6One can also interpret the decision to produce the green good as a way to avoid the environmental taxation.
7We will not explicitly solve the quality competition stage, as our focus is on comparing a new policy tool like the
campaign with the traditional tax instrument.
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Lemma 1 Both rms are active in the market i¤ b > bmin and t < tmax.
Proof. See Appendix.
We assume that the conditions reported in Lemma 1 hold throughout the section. They indicate
that a su¢ ciently large consumersheterogeneity together with a non excessive taxation are required
for both rms to coexist in the market. We limit our attention to such a case as we want to reproduce
a concrete situation where polluting rms compete in the market with non-polluting ones. Moreover,
it is usually in the best interest of the society to have the highest number of rms, and this will be
also conrmed by the model.
Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
xL =
qH [qL (t+ bqH   bqL)  c (2qH   qL)]
(4qH   qL) (qH   qL) qL ;
xH =
qH [2b(qH   qL) + c]  t (2qH   qL)
(4qH   qL) (qH   qL) :
By construction, @xH=@t < 0 and @x

L=@t > 0. Moreover, notice that @(x

H + x

L)=@t < 0. Taxation
shrinks total output, thus implying that consumer surplus decreases when the government applies
such a tool. This trade-o¤ between output provision and environmental protection represents one of
the point of interest of our analysis.8 Equilibrium prots are given by:
L =
qL
qH
(qH   qL) (xL)2
H = (qH   qL) (xH)2
Social welfare as a function of t writes in a compact form as:
SW  (t) = L + 

H + CS

L + CS

H   e  xH + t  xH : (3)
The precise expression of CSL and CS

H are reported in the Appendix (See Proof of Proposition 1).
Algebraic calculations reveal that SW  (t) is concave in t. We can therefore compute the optimal
tax rate which maximizes social welfare:
t =
e(4qH   qL) (2qH   qL)  qH [b (4qH   3qL) (qH   qL) + 2c (2qH   qL)]
qH (4qH   3qL) (4)
Taking into account that t has to be non-negative, and that the conditions appearing in Lemma 1
have to be satised:
Lemma 2 t 2 [0; tmax) when e 2 [etmin; etmax).
8Controversies exist between those arguing that environmental policy is likely to stie competitiveness by imposing
additional burdens on rmsproduction costs, and those claiming that new environmental technologies can prompt
competitiveness among rms. Although this is not the specic objective of our analysis, the trade-o¤ that has just
been shown is part of such an ongoing discussion.
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Proof. From (4), t > 0 i¤ e > etmin =
qH [b (4qH   3qL) (qH   qL) + 2c (2qH   qL)]
(4qH   qL) (2qH   qL) , while t
 < tmax
i¤ e < etmax =
qH [b (4qH   3qL) (qH   qL) + c (3qH   2qL)]
(2qH   qL)2
:
For very low values of e, the optimal tax is zero because the negative e¤ect on output is higher
than the positive e¤ect induced by the reduction in the emission level.9 On the contrary, for very
high values of the polluting emission, the optimal tax is tmax. In such a case, the prot of the high
quality rm tends to zero. It is relatively easy to demonstrate that the government would prefer to
leave an " ! 0 to the polluting rm, and then still have a duopoly, instead of pushing it out from
the market. The previous discussion is summarized into:
Remark 1 Depending on the value associated to the environmental damage e, the government
optimally sets: (i) t = 0 when e < etmin; (ii) t = t
 when e 2 [etmin; etmax); (iii) t = tmax when
e > etmax.
Depending on the emission level, we nd therefore three di¤erent values of t which should be
inserted in the social welfare function (3). These equilibrium values, as well as those associated to the
optimal environmental campaign, are reported in the Appendix (see again the Proof of Proposition
1).
2.2 Supporting the environmental campaign
Assume that the policy maker implements a campaign to inform consumers about the damaging
emission released by good H. As introduced before, the campaign that we have in mind aims
at creating a social stigma against the consumption of the polluting (brown) good. This should
encourage consumers to increase the consumption of the green good at the expense of the brown one.
This generates a green expansive e¤ect, as it will be labelled in the paper.
Formally, a new term appears in the indirect utility, namely  > 0, which multiplies the quality
gap:10
U () =
8<:
qH   pH    (qH   qL) , if she buys the high quality good,
qL   pL +  (qH   qL) , if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all is:
L =  +
pL   qH
qL
=
pL    (qH   qL)
qL
(5)
9Although mathematically correct, we disregard the case in which the government o¤ers a subsidy (negative t) to
help the polluting rm.
10An alternative, and probably more costly campaign should inform consumers about the emission level. This could
be represented by:
qH   pH   e
qL   pL + e:
Notice that in such a scenario  represents the level of accuracy of the information provided. One can think of  2 (0; 1)
as a measure of such accuracy. However, such a formulation increases the di¢ culty of the mathematical expressions
without changing the main message.
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The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high quality good is:
H = 2 +
pH   pL
qH   qL =
pH   pL + 2 (qH   qL)
qH   qL (6)
Note that, given prices, the market share of L increases in . The consumer that is indi¤erent between
not buying at all and buying the low quality (L) moves to the left, while the one indi¤erent between
buying the low quality and the high quality (H) moves to the right. Contrary to the previous case,
the market (hypothetically) can be covered. Consumer of type  = 0 can have a positive utility
from buying L if  (qH   qL) > pL. However, we can show that this is not compatible with the basic
assumptions of the model, in particular that pH > pL.11 We focus therefore on the uncovered market
situation.
Demands are formally written as before: xL = H   L and xH = b   H , yet the indi¤erent
consumers are a¤ected by , as represented in (6) and (5). Producing the low quality (green) good
still requires a per-unit cost c > 0, while the high quality (brown) is produced at zero cost. Prot
functions are expressed as:
H = xH  pH ,
L = (pL   c)xL:
As there is no per-unit tax levied on the brown good, pollution is indirectly fought through the e¤ect
of the campaign on consumerspreferences. Equilibrium prices can easily be obtained:
pL =
2cqH + (qH   qL) (2qH + bqL)
4qH   qL ;
pH =
cqH + (qH   qL) [2bqH   (3qH   qL)]
4qH   qL :
The following condition is compatible with the basic assumptions of the model:
Lemma 3 Provided b > bmin, both rms stay in the market i¤ b > bmin and
 < min

b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)  cqH
(5qH   qL) (qH   qL) ;
2cqH + b (qH   qL) qL
(2qH   qL) (qH   qL)

 max.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equilibrium variables are then:
xL =
qH [(qH   qL) (2qH   qL)  c (2qH   qL)]
qL (4qH   qL) (qH   qL) ; x

H =
pH
(qH   qL) ;
L =
qL
qH
(qH   qL) (xL)2 ; H =
(xH )
2
(qH   qL) :
By construction, we nd that @xL =@ > 0 and @x

H =@ > 0 < 0, as expected. However, di¤erently
from before, total output increases in . Consumer surplus tends therefore to be higher than in the
11Formally, L < 0 requires a relatively high value of ; and this is not compatible with the condition pH > pL, that
requires on the contrary a low value of . The market coverage conguration would only arise when the low green
quality rm dominates the market. We discuss in Section 4 the consequences of extending the analysis to larger values
of the parameter .
9
previous case, thus solving the trade-o¤ between total output (that determines the degree of market
competition) and total emissions (that determines the degree of environmental protection) that we
highlighted with the taxation instrument.
The social welfare function writes in a compact way as :
SW  () = L + 

H + CS

L + CS

H   e  xH   s
2
2
; (7)
where the precise expressions of CSL +CS

H are conned to the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition
1). Di¤erently from the taxation case, the social welfare is concave in the policy instrument only for
su¢ ciently high values of the marginal cost of the campaign. In particular, this requires:
s >
(qH   qL)
 
12q3H + 19q
2
HqL   13qHq2L + 2q3L

qL (4qH   qL)2
 smin (8)
We assume that s > smin. This accounts for the fact that it becomes increasingly di¢ cult to convince
consumers to buy the green good. We compute the optimal  level which maximizes social welfare:
 =
qH
 
cqHqL   12cq2H   3bq3L + cq2L + 11bqHq2L   8bq2HqL

+ e qL (qL   4qH) (qL   3qH)
s qL (qL   4qH)2   (qH   qL)
 
12q3H + 2q
3
L   13qHq2L + 19q2HqL
 : (9)
Taking into account that   0 and that the conditions from Lemma 4 have to be satised, we nd:
Lemma 4 Assume max =
b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)  cqH
(5qH   qL) (qH   qL) . Then 
 2 [0; max) when e 2 [emin; emax).
Proof. See the Appendix, where one can also nd the precise values of emin and e

max.
The optimal policy is  = 0 as long as the emission level is very low because the cost of the
campaign does not compensate the positive e¤ect linked to the emission reduction. In contrast, for
very high values of the emission, the optimal policy is  = max. In such a case, the prot of the
high quality rm are still positive (note that for  = max the demand for the high quality good is
still positive). The previous discussion is summarized into:
Remark 2 Depending on the value taken by the polluting emission e, the government optimally
sets: (i)  = 0 when e < emin; (ii)  = 
 when e 2 [emin; emax); (iii)  = max when e > etmax.
2.3 Comparing the two instruments under hedonic qualities
We now compare the two policy instruments: taxation versus campaign. First of all, we need to
rank the threshold values of e that indicate the regions where di¤erent levels of social welfare occur.
The ranking depends on the combination between the average hedonic quality b and the cost of the
campaign s. In the Appendix we detail all the possible cases and perform the relative comparisons.
The following proposition summarizes the most important result:
Proposition 1 Assume that consumers are not environmentally concerned (hedonic preferences).
The social welfare preferences are such that, if the cost of the environmental campaign is
su¢ ciently high (s > smin), then the tax instrument is always preferred to the environmental
campaign.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
When the social welfare associated to the environmental campaign is concave, the government
always prefers the taxation instrument. Under the assumptions of our model, taxation can also
completely eliminate the high quality rm H (or leave it with zero prot), while the environmental
campaign entails a high cost s which makes such an e¤ort undesirable. These social preferences
are mainly due the fact that the conditions for the uncovered market that we analyze imply that
 cannot be too high. This is to assume that the campaign is not "revolutionary", that is not so
e¤ective to induce all consumers (also the more H oriented consumer) to switch to the green good.
We believe that such an assumption is realistic as it captures a situation in which at least a part of
the population would not change its consumption behaviour after the campaign.12
Results change if we consider relatively low costs associated to the environmental campaign. We
discuss in Section 4 this issue.
3 Environmental qualities
We next consider the case in which consumers value the environmental quality. Formally  now
measures the environmental quality rather then the hedonic quality. We assume that consumers
consider as low quality good the one that pollutes (brown good), whereas the high quality good
is the green one, which has zero emissions. The environmental damage is then D = e  xL. Note
that parameter b > 0, again, measures consumersheterogeneity but di¤erently from the previous
scenario, it now measures the average valuation of the environmental quality in the market. Thus,
we can state that the higher is b the more the average consumer cares about the environment.
As before, the government may intervene through a traditional taxation of the polluting good
or through a campaign that augments consumersenvironmental sensitivity by introducing relative
preferences. Accordingly, we develop the following two-stage game that we solve by backward in-
duction: rst, the policy maker decides whether to intervene and which policy instrument to use to
reduce the environmental damage; second, rms compete in prices.
3.1 Taxing the polluting good
Consumer of type  2 [0; b] has the following utility:
U () =
8<:
qH   pH , if she buys the high (green) quality good,
qL   pL, if she buys the low (brown) quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
where qH > qL indicates the environmental qualities of the two goods and thus  measures consumers
willingness to pay for environmental quality. The consumer indi¤erent between buying the brown
quality good and not buying at all is:
L =
pL
qL
12We discuss in more details the role of  in Section 4.
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The consumer indi¤erent between buying the brown quality good and the green quality good is:
H =
pH   pL
qH   qL
Demands are given again by xL = H   L and xH = b  H . As before, producing the green quality
good requires a constant marginal cost c > 0, while the brown quality good is assumed to be produced
at zero cost. However, this good is subject to a per-unit tax t which represents the tax di¤erential
between the two rms. On the other hand, c represents the marginal production cost di¤erential.
Prot functions are therefore:
L = (pL   t)xL;
H = (pH   c)xH :
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve the price competition stage and derive the main
results, which are valid for each quality conguration. Equilibrium prices are:
pEH =
qH [2c+ t+ 2b (qH   qL)]
4qH   qL > 0
pEL =
cqL + 2tqH + qLb (qH   qL)
4qH   qL > 0
Additional superscript E indicates that we are considering environmental preferences. This will be
used throughout this section to di¤erentiate from the hedonic preferences scenario that has been
considered in the previous section.
If pH > pL, both demands are positive. If instead pH  pL, the demand for the low quality good
is zero: DL = 0 and DH = b   pHqH . We consider the case in which both rms stay in the market.
This requires the conditions provided in the following lemma to hold. Dene:
bEmin 
c (2qH   qL)
2qH (qH   qL) ; (10)
tEmax 
qL [c+ b(qH   qL)]
(2qH   qL) : (11)
Lemma 5 Both rms stay in the market i¤ b > bEmin and t < t
E
max.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
xEL =
qH [cqL   t (2qH   qL) + bqL(qH   qL)]
(qH   qL) (4qH   qL) qL
xEH =
2bqH(qH   qL)  c(2qH   qL) + tqH
(4qH   qL) (qH   qL)
Following the assumption of environmental qualities, we can observe that @xEL =@t < 0 and @x
E
H =@t >
0. Moreover, notice that @(xEH + x
E
L )=@t < 0: total output decreases with t. Equilibrium prots
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are given by:
EL =
qL
qH
(qH   qL)
 
xEL
2
;
EH = (qH   qL)
 
xEH
2
:
They are expressed in the same way as with hedonic preferences, but obviously with di¤erent equi-
librium quantities.
Social welfare as a function of t writes in a compact form as:
SW E (t) = EL + 
E
H + CS
E
L + CS
E
H   e  xEL + t  xEL ; (12)
where the value of CSEL +CS
E
H is reported in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 2). Algebraic
calculations show that the social welfare function is still concave in t. The optimal tax rate can be
found as follows:
@SW E (t)
@t
= 0 () t = e (4qH   qL) (2qH   qL) + qL[bqL(qH   qL)  2c (2qH   qL)]
qH (4qH   3qL)  t
E . (13)
Taking into account that tE has to be non-negative, and that the conditions from Lemma 5 have to
be satised:
Lemma 6 tE 2 [0; tEmax) when e 2 [max

0; etEmin
	
; etEmax).
Proof. From (13), tE  0 i¤ e  etEmin =
qL[2c (2qH   qL)  bqL(qH   qL)]
(4qH   qL) (2qH   qL)  0 () b 
2c (2qH   qL)
qL (qH   qL) 
bb. tE < tEmax i¤ e < etEmax = c (2qH   qL) + 2b (qH   qL)2(2qH   qL) , with etEmax > etEmin.
We summarize the optimal tax policy in the following remark.
Remark 3 Depending on the value taken by the polluting emission e, the government optimally
sets: (i) t = 0 when e < etEmin [ b 2 (bEmin;bb); (ii) t = tE when e 2 [etEmin; etEmax) [ b 2 (bEmin;bb)
and when e 2 [0; etEmax) [ b > bb (iii) t = tEmax when e  etEmax.
Notice that when t = tEmax, the prot of the low quality rm tends to zero. Using the same
reasoning as in the previous case, it is relatively easy to prove that the government would prefer to
leave an " ! 0 to the polluting rm, and then keep the duopoly, instead of pushing the rm out of
the market. The expressions for the social welfare for the three di¤erent values of t which appear in
Remark 3 are in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 2).
3.2 Supporting the environmental campaign
Assume that the policy maker implements a campaign that creates a social stigma for brown L
consumers while at the same time praising green H consumers. The utility from buying is then as
follows:
U () =
8<:
qH   pH +  (qH   qL) if she buys the green good,
qL   pL    (qH   qL) if she buys the brown good,
0 if she refrains from buying.
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The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all is:
L =
pL +  (qH   qL)
qL
The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high quality good is:
H =
pH   pL   2 (qH   qL)
qH   qL
Notice that for given prices, relative preferences are such that the market share of H increases in ,
as the consumer who is indi¤erent between not buying and buying L (L) moves to the right, while
the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying L and H (H) moves to the left.
Following the previous discussion, the demands for the goods are therefore given by xL = H L
and xH = b   H . Again, we assume that producing the green good implies higher costs than the
brown good (c > 0). Prots are then H = xH (pH   c) and L = pLxL. Price competition yields:
pEL =
qL[c+ b (qH   qL)]  2qH (qH   qL)
4qH   qL ;
pEH =
2cqH + (qH   qL) [2bqH + (3qH   qL)]
4qH   qL :
The following condition is compatible with the basic assumptions of the model:
Lemma 7 The market is uncovered and both rms stay in the market i¤ b > bEmin and  <
qL [c+ b (qH   qL)]
2qH (qH   qL)  
E
max.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
xEL =
qHfqL[c+ b (qH   qL)]  2qH (qH   qL)g
(qH   qL) (4qH   qL) qL ;
xEH =
[ (3qH   qL) + 2bqH ] (qH   qL)  c (2qH   qL)
(qH   qL) (4qH   qL) :
As before, notice that xL decreases with , while xH increases with . However, overall total output
now decreases with , meaning that the environmental campaign is not a priori increasing consumer
surplus.
Equilibrium prots are now given by:
EL =
qL
qH
(qH   qL) (xL )2
EH = (qH   qL) (xH )2
The social welfare function writes in a compact way as :
SW E () = EL + 
E
H + CS
E
L + CS
E
H   e  xEL   s
2
2
; (14)
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where s is the marginal cost of the campaign. The social welfare function is concave in  if and only
if s > smin, where smin is dened in (8). In this case it is possible to compute the optimal level of 
that maximizes social welfare:
E =
2eq2H (4qH   qL) + qL[2c(6qHqL   10q2H   q2L) + bqH (8qH   3qL) (qH   qL)]
sqL (4qH   qL)2   (qH   qL)
 
12q3H + 2q
3
L   13qHq2L + 19q2HqL
 : (15)
Taking into account that E has to be non-negative and that the the conditions reported in Lemma
7 have to be satised, we nd:
Lemma 8  2 [0; Emax) when e 2 [maxf0; eEming; eEmax).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We summarize the optimal environmental policy in the following remark.
Remark 4 Depending on the value taken by the polluting emission e, the government optimally
sets: (i)  = 0 when e < eEmin [ b 2 (bmin; eb); (ii)  = E when e 2 [eEmin; eEmax) [ b 2 (bEmin;eb)
and when e 2 [0; eEmax) [ b > eb; (iii) t = tEmax when e  eEmax.
The threshold value eb can be found in the Appendix (Proof of Proposition 8), as well as the
complete expression for the social welfare in the three cases reported in Remark 4 (again in the Proof
of Proposition 2). We can now compare the two scenarios to nd out which policy instrument should
be adopted by the government.
3.3 Comparing the two instruments under environmental qualities
As in the previous scenario, we need to rank the threshold values of e that dene the regions where
di¤erent levels of social welfare occur. The ranking depends on parameters b and s. In the Appendix
we detail all the possible cases. The following proposition summarizes the most important results.
Let
b1 =
2c(28q4H   53q3HqL + 36q2Hq2L   10qHq3L + q4L)
qH (4qH   3qL) (qH   qL) (10q2H   6qHqL + q2L)
,
b2 =
2c (2qH   qL)2
qH
 
4q2H   7qHqL + 3q2L
 .
Proposition 2 Assume that consumers are environmentally concerned. The social welfare prefer-
ences are such that:
(i) for b low values of b (b  b1), the tax instrument is socially more e¢ cient than the environmental
campaign.
(ii) For intermediate values of b (b 2 (b1; b2)), the tax instrument prevails as long as the cost of the
campaign is su¢ ciently high. For a relatively low cost of the campaign, taxation dominates the
campaign only if the quality ratio qH=qL is not excessive. When the quality ratio is high, there
exists a threshold level for the polluting emission above which the environmental campaign is
preferred and under which taxation is preferred.
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(iii) For b high values of b (b  b2), the environmental campaign is socially more e¢ cient than the
tax instrument, unless both the cost of the campaign and the emission levels are su¢ ciently
high.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results coming from the above proposition reveal that an indirect instrument as the envi-
ronmental campaign can be more e¢ cient than a direct tax levied on the brown good. The two
preconditions for that to happen is that the cost of the campaign be not too excessive, and that
the average evaluation of the environmental quality in the market be su¢ ciently high. While the
rst precondition is trivial, the second one is less obvious. In particular, it highlights that the green
expansive e¤ect of the environmental campaign increases in b: the higher the average evaluation for
the environmental quality in the market, the larger the number of consumers willing to buy the green
good. Such an e¤ect implies that, for a given cost s, an increase in b increases the e¤ectiveness of
the campaign in reducing the polluting emissions.
Therefore, for low values of b, the green expansive e¤ect is almost irrelevant, and taxing the
polluting product is preferred from the social standpoint. In contrast, for high values of b, then
such an e¤ect becomes crucial and the campaign turns out to be more e¢ cient than the taxation
instrument, provided its cost is not exaggerated.
Finally, when b 2 (b1; b2), the green expansion e¤ect is intermediate and the comparison between
the two instruments includes more elements which can either tend to reinforce or to stie the relevancy
of such an e¤ect. Again, taxation prevails in terms of e¢ ciency when s is high. On the contrary,
when the campaign is relatively a¤ordable, we nd that the quality ratio qH=qL may compensate for
b. In particular, when qH=qL is su¢ ciently high, meaning that the brown good is very distant from
the green good in terms of the quality perceived by environmentally concerned consumers, then the
campaign can be welfare improving as compared to the tax instrument, especially if the polluting
damage is severe (i.e. if e exceeds a certain value). The explanation relies on the fact that a relatively
inexpensive campaign can reduce the consumption of a good whose (environmental) quality is very
low, and this is even more important when the external emission released by such good is very
polluting.
Moreover, it is worth noticing that a relatively high emission level e can determine a preference
for the taxation instrument, when the campaign is su¢ ciently costly. The role of e is therefore
ambiguous:
Corollary 1 When b  b1, a high emission level may favor the adoption of the campaign if its cost is
low, while it may induce the social planner to tax the polluting good if the cost of the campaign
is high.
Hence, depending on the cost of the campaign, a high emission level can determine whether
the policy maker should adopt the environmental campaign or the taxation instrument. When
b 2 (b1; b2) taxation is usually preferred given that consumersheterogeneity is limited. However,
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when the quality ratio is very high, the brown good is perceived of very poor quality: a high emission
level may then convince the policy maker to implement the campaign instead of taxing the polluting
good, provided the cost of the campaign is not excessive. On the contrary, when b  b2, if the
campaign is costly, then taxation prevails when pollution increases.
4 A tale of two worlds
The purpose of our paper was to examine social welfare under two di¤erent policy instruments, both
aiming at reducing pollution emissions, in two di¤erent "worlds", one populated by environmentally
conscious citizens, while the other by those indi¤erent to environmental issues.
The main conclusion that one can draw when comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2 is that
consumerspreliminary sensitivity towards the environment is a necessary condition for the environ-
mental campaign to prove more e¢ cient than the pollution tax. Remember that we evaluate the
relative performance of the two instruments on the basis of total social welfare. In both our "worlds",
the environmental campaign is indeed e¤ective in reducing the pollution emissions. Indeed, it shifts
the buying decision of (at least) some consumers from the brown to the green good, independently
of consumersconcern about the environment. However, when compared to other instruments like
the pollution tax, the campaign may not be the welfare maximizing policy when the environmental
concern is low.
In our model, in fact, such a preliminary concern a¤ects the same denition of quality. When
consumers are environmentally indi¤erent, for example, they tend to measure the quality in terms
of the intrinsic performance of a product. The green expansive e¤ect generated by the campaign is
therefore weak, and it does not compensate for the cost required to support the campaign itself. A
traditional instrument like the pollution tax, which is directly levied on the production of the polluting
good, turns out to be more e¢ cient. In addition, it represents a net gain for the government. For
the environmental campaign to be also socially e¢ cient, we need a scenario in which the market
evaluation of the environmental quality is su¢ ciently high.
In real world terms, this translates into di¤erent environmental policies adopted in di¤erent
countries. Extreme examples of what we have in mind are provided by Sweden and China. While
the former is an early adopter of sustainable thinking and one of the few industrialized countries to
have reduced its carbon emissions,13 the latter may well represent an example of a country where
environmental protection is not a main concern. Empirical support for our statement comes from the
Eurostat statistics on EU countriestax revenues on pollution as a percentage of GDP: in 2011 the
EU average was 0.11, while Sweden was well below this value (0.05).14 China, on the contrary, su¤ers
13Back in the 1960s, Sweden recognised that the rapid loss of natural resources had to be confronted, and took a lead
in organising the rst UN conference on the environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. For further details on Swedish
environmental policies, visit www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Society/Sustainability/Facts/Environment.
14Clearly, these numbers cannot be taken as strong evidence supporting our results, given that a low tax revenue
in a country could also be due to tax evasion or simply a mild environmental policy by that government. However,
at least looking at Sweden (and Finland as well with 0.06) we can reasonably conclude that this is linked to a strong
environmental concern of consumers.
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from severe environmental damages to natural resources associated with the countrys rapid economic
successes.15 Recent measures taken by the Chinese government aims at improving its environmental
situation. However, this is mainly done by resorting to traditional policy instruments.16
We would like to point out that our policy implications are based on total social welfare as a
measure of a social well-being. While this is a quite standard measure of welfare, a policy maker
may decide to put di¤erent weights on consumer and producer surplus when evaluating a policy
intervention. Our results may therefore change if we consider consumer surplus as an alternative
measure of welfare. Indeed, as put forward in the model, taxation shrinks total output, thus implying
that consumer surplus decreases when the government applies such a tool. This holds under both
hedonic and environmental preferences. As for the environmental campaign, it has a similar e¤ect
but only with environmental preferences. Under hedonic preferences, on the contrary, the e¤ect of
the campaign is to increase total output, thus expanding consumer surplus. This means that if one
attaches a relatively high weight to consumer surplus, then the environmental campaign may surpass
the taxation instrument in terms of e¢ ciency even if consumers are environmentally unconcerned.
4.1 Discussion on the assumptions
It is worth discussing the main technical assumptions of our model in order to check the robustness
of our results. The rst assumption is related to the existence of two "worlds"; one characterized by
hedonic preferences and the other by environmental preferences. We acknowledge that this implies
two polarized scenarios, and that in any society we nd environmentally concerned consumers to-
gether with unconcerned one. Hence, usually these two "worlds" coexist in the same city, country,
and region. However, the separation that we adopt in our theoretical representation is crucial to
understand which policy is socially preferable among these di¤erent consumers. Clearly, there exists
a continuum of intermediate scenarios where, for instance, a fraction  of consumers is environmen-
tally unconcerned, whereas the complementary fraction (1  ) is environmentally concerned. We
believe, that, while this may represent an interesting extension of our modeling strategy, it would not
add much to our point. Our guess is that there would be an  threshold such that the campaign
would prove to be more e¢ cient than the tax instrument as long as the fraction of environmentally
concerned consumers is su¢ ciently high (and viceversa).
Secondly, we assume that the cost of the environmental campaign is su¢ ciently high (s > smin):
this ensures that the social welfare function is concave in the environmental campaign (). This
allows us to nd, for intermediate emission levels, the optimal level of the environmental campaign.
For s < smin, the social welfare function is convex in , meaning that the optimal campaign level is
reached either in  = 0 or in  = max. Considering hedonic preferences, it is possible to demonstrate
that, when s < smin, there are conditions for which a relatively cheaper campaign can be more more
15China recently became the worlds second largest economy by aggregate GNP.
16See for instance a recent press article in The Guardian pointing out Chinas new ve-year cleanup strategy based
on environmental tax on heavy polluters. For more information, visit www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/04/china-
green-tax-polluters.
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e¢ cient than the pollution tax. In particular, this is more likely to happen for relatively high values
of parameter b, i.e. when consumersex-ante heterogeneity is prominent. However, as both goods are
still on the market, the emission level should not be perceived as too dangerous by the social planner,
otherwise a more direct taxation instrument is to be preferred.17 In contrast, in the environmental
preferences scenario our qualitative results do not change, and the campaign is, a fortiori, more
e¢ cient than the tax instrument in most cases.
Thirdly, notice that we restrict our attention to su¢ ciently low levels of the environmental cam-
paign: this assumption ensures that both rms stay in the market and that the initial quality ranking
does not reverse. In particular, in the environmental preferences scenario, the threshold value of 
(max) is such that, beyond this value, the low (brown) quality rm would be inactive in the market.
In contrast, in the hedonic preferences scenario, the threshold value of  (max) is such that, again
beyond this value, the low (green) quality rm would become the high quality one. That is, we
would observe, due to the e¤ect of the campaign, a switch in the hedonic qualities.18 In other words,
in order to keep the initial hedonic qualitiesranking, we assume that the campaign cannot be too
"revolutionary". Notice, however, that our results are robust to this assumption. Indeed, in the
environmental preferences scenario, it would not make sense to further pursue the campaign. Once
the brown rm is pushed o¤ the market, then the emissions reach their minimal level. On the other
hand, in the hedonic preferences scenario, extending the analysis to comprehend higher levels of 
would alter the equilibrium market structure. In particular, this would imply passing rst from an
uncovered to a covered duopoly market (at the limit), and then to a monopoly dominated by the
low green quality rm. Yet again, our main result would hold. For environmentally unconcerned
consumers, the tax instrument would remain more e¢ cient than the campaign. In fact, recall that
pursuing high levels of the environmental campaign would require increasing costs.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered two di¤erent worlds, depending on whether consumerspreferences
are ex ante a¤ected by environmental concerns or not. The rst world deals with consumers who
value only the intrinsic quality of the good. The second one is instead characterized by consumers who
appreciate the environmental sustainability more than the pure performance of the purchased good
. The automotive industry, for instance, provides various case studies in support of the two di¤erent
theoretical scenarios that we represented. Consumers, in fact, tend to have di¤erent valuations
regarding the performance of the vehicle as compared its environmental impact.
In both cases, we have studied the adoption of two di¤erent policies by the social planner/government.
The conventional tax on the emission of pollution has been compared with an environmental cam-
17The comparison between the di¤erent social welfares when s  smin is not present in the Appendix. As the Proof
of Proposition 1 is already very long, we decided to skip the formal demonstration of ancillary results which are not at
the core of our paper. They are, however, available upon request.
18Technically, the equilibrium price of the high brown quality good would be lower than the equilibrium price of the
low green quality good but still both goods would stay in the market.
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paign which aimed at stigmatizing the polluting (brown) good. By design, both policy instruments
are e¤ective in reducing the polluting emissions. However, their e¢ ciency from a social welfare
point of view changes accordingly to consumer environmental concern. More precisely, in case of
environmentally unconcerned consumers, the tax instrument reveals to be more e¢ cient than the
environmental campaign, whereas the opposite may occur when consumers value the environmental
quality of the goods.
In the previous section, we have also discussed the robustness of the main assumptions of our
model, together with its main limitations. Nonetheless, we believe that our paper may represent an
interesting starting point in order to evaluate the relative performance of environmental campaign
vis à vis traditional policy instruments. Moreover, additional theoretical and empirical research must
be carried out with the aim of providing accurate results, thereby helping the policy maker in the
design of the best suited instrument for social welfare in order to curb pollution emission.
On the theoretical ground, an interesting extension of our research concerns the potential dynamic
e¢ ciency of the campaign itself. Consider, for instance, an initial scenario where consumers are
characterized by hedonic preferences. Although environmental campaigns may not pay o¤ in the
short term, they may gradually become ingrained in the social consciousness, thereby providing a
foundation for the success of future campaigns. Thus, we should compare the static e¢ ciency of the
tax instrument with the dynamic e¢ ciency of the environmental campaign. Related to this issue,
we may also think of using dynamic models to capture the idea that the cost of the campaign could
decrease over time.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We focus on the case in which the price of the high quality good is higher than that of the low
quality:
pH   pL > 0 () t > cqH
2qH   qL   b(qH   qL) 
et:
Moreover, we have to guarantee that at these equilibrium prices both rms are active in the market.
This implies that we have to simultaneously satisfy the conditions for which 0 < L < H < b. We
obtain:
L =
qLb (qH   qL) + tqL + 2cqH
(4qH   qL) qL > 0, always;
H   L > 0 () t > c (2qH   qL)  bqL(qH   qL)
qL
 tmin ;
H   b < 0 () t < qH [2b (qH   qL) + c]
(2qH   qL)  tmax.
It is easy to demonstrate that tmin > et, and then pH > pL when H > L: Moreover, tmin < 0 ()
b >
c (2qH   qL)
qL (qH   qL)  bmin. It is convenient to assume that b > bmin in order to eliminate the condition
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t > tmin. This reduces the number of cases to be examined, without losing economic intuition. By
combining the previous conditions, it follows that condition b > bmin combined with t < tmax are
required to have both players active in an uncovered market.
Proof of Lemma 3
To start with, notice that
pH   pL > 0 ()  < b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)  cqH
(5qH   qL) (qH   qL) :
This threshold value of  decreases in c and increases in b. On the one hand, the higher c is, the
lower the value which guarantees that both goods are in the market, that is the more stringent the
constraint because pL becomes increasingly higher than pH . On the other hand, the higher parameter
b is, the higher the threshold for  for both goods to stay in the market, that is the less binding the
constraint because consumers become increasingly heterogeneous and competition softens.19
We have to check whether at the equilibrium prices both rms are in the market, i.e. we need to
verify that 0 < L < H < b:
L =
2cqH + (qH   qL) [bqL   (2qH + qL)]
(4qH   qL) qL > 0 ()  <
2cqH + b (qH   qL) qL
(qL   2qH) (qL   qH) ;
H   L = qH [c (qL   2qH) + (qH   qL) (bqL + 2qH)]
(qL   qH) (qL   4qH) qL > 0 always when b > bmin;
H   b = (qL   qH) [2bqH   (3qH   qL)]  cqH
(qL   qH) (qL   4qH) < 0, always when pH   pL > 0.
Assuming that b > bmin, we need therefore only to compare the two threshold values of . This com-
parison depends on b. However, as we will demonstrate that exactly the same results appear when us-
ing one of the two values, we can use max = min

b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)  cqH
(5qH   qL) (qH   qL) ;
2cqH + b (qH   qL) qL
(qL   2qH) (qL   qH)

:
Proof of Lemma 4
From (9),   0 i¤ e  emin =
qH [qLb (3qL   8qH) (qL   qH)  c (qL   3qH) (4qH + qL)]
qL (qL   4qH) (qL   3qH) .
If max =
b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)  cqH
(5qH   qL) (qH   qL)  
1
max, we have that 
 < max when
e < emax =
(qH qL)(18cq3H 6bq4H+2bq4L 8bqHq3L+8bq3HqL 3cqHq2L+5cq2HqL+4bq2Hq2L)+sqL(4qH qL)(2bq2H 3bqHqL cqH+bq2L)
qL(3qH qL)(qL qH)(qL 5qH) ;
while if max =
2cqH + b (qH   qL) qL
(qL   2qH) (qL   qH)  
2
max we have that 
 < max when
e < emax =
(qH qL)(13cq2H bq3H 3cqHqL+2bq3L 10bqHq2L+9bq2HqL)+s(4qH qL)(bq2L bqHqL 2cqH)
(qH qL)(qL 2qH)(3qH qL) .
19 If  is high relative to b or b is low relative to  the high quality good goes out of the market: even the highest
quality oriented consumer (which is b) will buy the low quality green good. The same hold when b is low relative to ,
in fact the higher b the more heterogeneous are consumers and so the more di¢ cult that the market is served by only
one quality.
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Proof of Proposition 1
First of all, when taxing the polluting good, remember that the social welfare function appears
in (3), where:
CSL =
HZ
L
(qL   pL) d = (x

L)
2
2
 qL;
CSH =
bZ
H
(qH   pH) d = xH 
qH

2b
 
q2H   q2L
  c (3qH   2qL)  t (2qH   qL)
(4qH   qL) (qH   qL) :
The optimal tax rate t which maximizes social welfare appears in (4), and from Lemma 1 we
know that t 2 [0; tmax) when e 2 [etmin; etmax). Hence, as reported in Remark 1, the government
sets: (i) t = 0 when e < etmin; (ii) t = t
 when e 2 [etmin; etmax); (iii) t = tmax when e > etmax. By
substituting into (3), we have:
SW jt=0 =
qH
2qL (4qH   qL)2 (qH   qL)

c2(12q2H   9qHqL + 2q2L)
 2cqL[4qH(e+ bqH)  qL(e+ 6bqH   2bqL)]
 b (qH   qL) qL[4e (4qH   qL) + b(12q2H   qHqL   2q2L)]
	
;
SW jt=t =
1
24

4(
e2
qH
+ 3b2qH   6be) + 12(e  c)
2
(qH   qL) +
9c2
qL
  (3c  4e)
2
4qH   qL

;
SW jt=tmax =
qH (3qH   2qL) (c  bqL)2
2qL(2qH   qL)2 :
Second, when activating the campaign, the social welfare function as a function of  is given by
(7), where:
CSL =
HZ
L
[(qL   pL) +  (qH   qL)] d = (x

L )
2
2
;
CSH =
bZ
H
[(qH   pH)   (qH   qL)] d = (x

H )
2
2
 qH

(2b+ )
 
q2H   q2L
  c (3qH + 2qL) :
The optimal  appears in (9); by combining the results in Lemma 4 with the considerations
reported in Remark 2, we obtain that, by substituting into (7):
SW j=0 = SW jt=0 by construction,
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SW j= =
1
2 (qL   qH)
h
(qL   qH) (12q3H + 2q3L   13qHq2L + 19q2HqL)  qL (4qH   qL)2 s
i f
2cqH (qH   qL)2 [e (6qH   qL)]  2bcqH (9qH   4qL) (qH + qL) + 8cq2HqL(e+ bqH)
 2cqHqL(e+ 6bqH)qL + 2bq2L)s+ (qH   qL) [b2qH (9qH   4qL) (qH   qL) (qL + qH)2]
+c2qH 
h
(9qH   4qL) (qH + qL)2   s
 
12q2H   9qHqL + 2q2L
i
+
+(qH   qL) [bqHqL(16eqH   12bq2H   4eqL + bqHqL + 2bq2L)s]
  (qH   qL) e2qL(3qH   qL)2 + 2beqH (qH   qL) (6qH   qL) (qH + qL)
	
;
SW j=max =
1
2qL
 
5q2H   9qHqL + 2q2L
 cqH 27q3H   36q2HqL   2q3L + qHqL(11qL   s)
+b  (qH   qL)2 (qH + qL)

b (qH + qL)
 
3q2H + 3qHqL   2q2L
  2eqL (5qH   qL)
 bqL
 
2q2H   3qHqL + q2L
2
s  4cqHqL (qH   qL) (5qH   qL) e
 2bcqH (qH   qL)

9q2H   5q2HqL + q2L(5qL + s)  qHqL(9qL + 2s)
	
:
For exposition purposes, we limit our attention to the case when max = 
1
max. However, tedious
numerical calculations show that the same results would hold even when considering max = 
2
max.
Now we can prove the main results of Proposition 1. When s > smin, by comparing the di¤erent
e-thresholds one can nd the following three cases.
 When b 2 (bmin;eb), with bmin dened in (1) andeb = c (3qH   qL)  16q3H   24q2HqL + 11qHq2L   q3L
qH (qH   qL) qL
 
16q2H   20qHqL + 5q2L
 ,
the ranking is as follows:
etmin < e
t
max < e

min < e

max:
 When b > eb and s 2 (smin; es), with smin dened in (8) and
es = (qH qL)fcqH(97q3HqL 72q4H 40q2Hq2L+2qHq3L+q4L)+b(qH qL)(3qH qL)(8q4H+12q3HqL 25q2Hq2L+11qHq3L 2q4L)g
qL(4qH qL)(2qH qL)2[b(qL 2qH)(qL qH) cqH ]
the ranking is:
etmin < e

min < e

max < e
t
max:
 Finally, for b > eb and s > es, we have that:
etmin < e

min < e
t
max < e

max:
Comparing the appropriate social welfare expressions, we can prove that, for any emission level e,
taxation always determines a higher welfare than the environmental campaign. In order to provide a
sketch of the proof, let us start from the rst interval region, in which b 2 (bmin;eb): Four subintervals
have to considered, depending on the emission level:20
20The case e 2  0;minfetmin; eming can be disregarded, as no policy instrument is adopted, and therefore SW j=0 
SW jt=0 = 0.
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1. For e 2  etmin; etmax, we compare SW j=0 with SW jt=t ; the result is SW j=0  SW jt=t < 0:
2. For e 2  etmax; emin, SW j=0   SW jt=tmax < 0.
3. In e 2 (emin, emax); by evaluating SW j= vis à vis SW jt=t we nd SW j=  SW jt=tmax <
0.
4. Finally, also in e > emax the taxation instrument prevails, as SW j=max   SW jt=tmax < 0.
The precise expressions of the welfare comparisons are very long and are not reported in the text.
They are available upon request with the list of the several numerical simulations that have been run
to verify our results.
Similar results can be obtained when b > eb and s 2 (smin; es); we do not replicate all the welfare
comparisons. However, the result is immediate to explain given that, ceteribus paribus, we are
increasing the parameter b which measures the average valuation of the hedonic quality in the market.
Given that consumers attach even more importance to the vertical hedonic quality, a campaign that
tries to make them aware of the environmental damage is less likely to function, and then taxation
is even more e¢ cient. Finally, in b > eb and s > es, the cost of the campaign is higher than in the
previous interval regions, and therefore, a fortiori, this kind of policy is deemed to fail when compared
to taxation.
Proof of Lemma 5
We focus on the case in which the price of the high quality good is higher than that of the low
quality:
pH   pL > 0 () t < 2bq
2
H   3bqHqL + bq2L + c (2qH   qL)
qH
 bt
Moreover, we have to guarantee that at these equilibrium prices both rms stay in the market. This
implies that we have to simultaneously satisfy conditions 0 < L < H < b:
L =
pL
qL
=
(cqL + 2tqH + qLb (qH   qL))
qL (4qH   qL) > 0
L   H =
 
cqL   t (2qH   qL) + bqHqL   bq2L

qH
(qH   qL) (qL   4qH) qL < 0 () t <
qL [c+ b(qH   qL)]
(2qH   qL)  t
E
max < bt
H   b =
 
2cqH   cqL   tqH + 2bqHqL   2bq2H

(qL   qH) (qL   4qH) < 0 () t >
2cqH   cqL + 2bqHqL   2bq2H
qH
 tEmin:
However, it is easy to show that tEmin < 0 () b >
2cqH   cqL
2qH (qH   qL) = b
E
min.
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Proof of Lemma 7
To start with, notice that:
pL > 0 ()  < qL [c+ b (qH   qL)]
2qH (qH   qL)  
E
max;
pH   pL = (qL   2qH) (bqL   bqH   c) +  (qL   5qH) (qL   qH)
(4qH   qL) > 0
Emax increases in c and in b. Next, we have to check whether at the equilibrium prices both rms are
in the market, i.e. we need to verify that 0 < L < H < b:
L =
qL (c+ bqH   bqL) +  (qL   2qH) (qL   qH)
(4qH   qL) qL > 0; always
H   L > 0 ()  < Emax;
b  H > 0 ()  > c (2qH   qL) + 2qHb (qL   qH)
(qL   3qH) (qL   qH)  
E
min
with Emin > 0 () b <
c (2qH   qL)
2qH (qH   qL)  b
E
min. Therefore, assuming that b > b
E
min implies that 
E
min
is negative and so H < b always holds.
Proof of Lemma 8
Consider (15). First: E > 0 () e > qL
 
12cqHqL + 8bq
3
H   20cq2H   2cq2L + 3bqHq2L   11bq2HqL

2q2H (4qH   qL)

eEmin; however, e
E
min > 0 () b < eb = 2c(10q2H   6qHqL + q2L)qH (qH   qL) (8qH   3qL) , with eb > bEmin. It follows
that E > 0 always when b > eb, and when b 2 (bEmin;eb) if e > eEmin. Second: E < Emax for
e <
qLf(7qH   2qL) (qH   qL)2 [c  b (qH   qL)] + [c+ b s (qH   qL)] (4qH   qL) qLg
4q3H (qH   qL)
 eEmax.
Proof of Proposition 2
The expression for the social welfare function when the government decides to levy a tax on the
polluting rm is (12), where:
CSEL + CS
E
H =
HZ
L
(qL   pL) d +
bZ
H
(qH   pH) d = qH
2 (4qH   qL)2 (qH   qL) qL

t2qH (4qH   3qL)
 2tqL(cqL   4bqHqL + 4bq2H) + qL(6bcqHqL + 4c2qH   3c2qL   8bcq2H + 2bcq2L + 4b2q3H   5b2qHq2L + b2q2HqL)
	
Combining the results of Lemma 6 and Remark 3, by substituting into (12), we have:
SW jt=0 =
1
2 (qL   4qH)2 (qH   qL)

c2
 
12q2H   9qHqL + 2q2L
  2eqH (qL   4qH) (bqL   bqH   c)
+b2qH (qL   qH)
 
qHqL   12q2H + 2q2L
  2bqHc (5qL   12qH) (qL   qH)	 ;
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SW jt=tE =
1
2 (qL   qH) (3qL   4qH) qL
n
e2 (qL   2qH)2   2eqL
 
3cqH   2cqL   2bqHqL + bq2H + bq2L

+qL

c2 (3qH   2qL)  2bc (2qL   3qH) (qL   qH) + b2
 
3q3H + q
3
L   4q2HqL
	
SW jt=tEmax =
(c  bqH)2 (3qH   2qL)
2 (2qH   qL)2
When the campaign is adopted, social welfare as a function of  is given by (14), where:
CSEL + CS
E
H =
1
2 (4qH   qL)2 (qH   qL) qL
n
2(qHqL + 4q
2
H   q2L) (qL   qH)2
+qHqL(6bcqHqL + 4c
2qH   3c2qL   8bcq2H + 2bcq2L + 4b2q3H   5b2qHq2L + b2q2HqL)
 2qHqL (qL   qH) [2c(qL   2qH) + bqL(qH   qL)]g :
Lemma 8 and Remark 4 indicate that, by substituting into (14), we have:
SW j=0 = SW jt=0 by construction,
SW j=E =
1
2
 
2q4L   12q4H + sq3L   15qHq3L   7q3HqL   8sqHq2L + 16sq2HqL + 32q2Hq2L

(qL   qH)
f
2bqLqHc (qL   qH)
 
9q3H   12sqHqL + 4q3L + 5sq2L   9qHq2L   4q2HqL

 qLc2
 
2sq3L   9q4H + 4qHq3L + 22q3HqL   9sqHq2L + 12sq2HqL   17q2Hq2L

+ e24q4H (qL   qH)
 qLb2qH (qL   qH)
 
9q4H + 4q
4
L + 2sq
3
L   5qHq3L + 5q3HqL + sqHq2L   12sq2HqL   13q2Hq2L

 2e[qLqHc
 
2q3L   7q3H   4sqHqL + sq2L   11qHq2L + 16q2HqL

]
+b (qH   qL)
 
7q3H   4sqHqL + 2q3L + sq2L   7qHq2L   2q2HqL
	
:
SW j=Emax =
1
8 (qL   qH)2 q2H

2bc (qL   qH)
 
3q3H + 2q
3
L + sq
2
L   3qHq2L   2q2HqL

+b2 (qL   qH)2
 
2q3L   3q3H + sq2L + qHq2L   4q2HqL

 c2  2q3L   3q3H + sq2L   7qHq2L + 8q2HqL	 ;
We can now prove the main results which appear in Proposition 2. Consider only the case where
we have internal solutions, i.e. we focus on the case where s > smin. By comparing the di¤erent
e-thresholds one can nd the four relevant cases. For each case, we perform the welfare comparisons.21
(i) When b 2  bEmin; b1, with bEmin dened in (1) and b1 = 2c(28q4H   53q3HqL + 36q2Hq2L   10qHq3L + q4L)qH (4qH   3qL) (qH   qL) (10q2H   6qHqL + q2L) ,
the ranking is as follows:
etEmin < e
tE
max < e
E
min < e
E
max:
For each subinterval we compare the relevant social welfare:
21We decided to omit the precise expressions for the welfare di¤erences for the sake of brevity. They can be available
upon request, as well as the analytical solutions and many numerical simulations which conrm our results.
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1. for e 2  etEmin; etEmax, SW j=0   SW jt=tE < 0,
2. for e 2

etEmax; e
E
min

, SW j=0   SW jt=tEmax < 0;
3. for e 2

eEmin; e
E
max

, SW j=E   SW jt=tEmax < 0;
4. for e > eEmax, SW j=Emax   SW jt=tEmax < 0.
We the conrm that for relatively low values of b the taxation instrument is always preferred.
(ii) When b 2 (b1; b2), where b2 = 2c (2qH   qL)
2
qH
 
4q2H   7qHqL + 3q2L
 ; with b2 > b1, we have two subcases:
(i) etEmin < e
E
min < e
E
max < e
tE
max when s 2 (smin; es) ;
(ii) etEmin < e
E
min < e
tE
max < e
E
max when s > es:
The rst subcase is the most interesting, as we nd that:
1. for e 2 (etEmin; eEmin), SW j=0   SW jt=tE < 0;
2. for e 2 (eEmin; eEmax), SW=E   SW jt=tE < 0 only when the quality ratio qH=qL is not
excessive. For very high values of qH=qL, there exists a threshold value of e above which
the environmental campaign is more e¢ cient than the taxation instrument (SW j=E  
SW jt=tE > 0).
3. For e 2 (eEmax; etEmax), we compare SW j=Emaxvs. SW jt=tE ; and nd that the environ-
mental campaign is more e¢ cient than the taxation instrument only for very high levels
of qH=qL. As the environmental damage is more severe in this region, the result holds for
each level of e 2 (eEmax; etEmax): When the quality ratio is lower than a certain threshold
value, then taxation prevails.
4. For e > etEmax, we compare SW j=Emax with SW jt=tEmax and nd similar results as in the
previous interval.
In the second case (s > es), on the contrary, the taxation instrument always prevails, as the cost
for activating the campaign is now higher. We omit all the di¤erent subcases for brevity.
(iii) When b 2 (b2; bb), with bb = 2c (2qH   qL)
(qH   qL) qL , we have three subcases:
(a) eEmin < e
E
max < e
tE
min < e
tE
max when s 2 (smin; s1) ;
(b) eEmin < e
tE
min < e
E
max < e
tE
max when s 2 (s1; es) ;
(c) eEmin < e
tE
min < e
tE
max < e
E
maxwhen s > es:
The rst two subcases can be explained together, as they provide the same result. Notice in
fact that the increase in parameter b implied an important switch in the threshold values of e
as compared to the previous case. Consider for example subcase (a), where the relevant welfare
comparisons are:
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1. for e 2 (eEmin; eEmax), SW j=E > SW jt=0 ; as can be immediately ascertained;
2. for e 2 (eEmax; etEmin), SW j=Emax > SW jt=0 ; and also this result is obvious;
3. for e 2 (etEmin; etEmax), we evaluate SW j=Emax vis à vis SW jt=tE . Algebraic calculations
conrm that SW j=Emax > SW jt=tE , and therefore the campaign is preferred.
4. Finally, for e > etEmax, we nd that SW j=Emax > SW jt=tEmax :
In subcase (b), the only di¤erence is that the taxation instrument can be adopted for a higher
interval region of parameter e, given that etEmin < e
E
max. However, similar results as those for
subcase (a) can be obtained, given that the cost for the campaign is still relatively low. Things
change in subcase (c), where we allow for a substantial increase in such a cost. By analyzing
the di¤erent subintervals of e, we nd that:
1. for e 2 (eEmin; etEmin), SW j=E > SW jt=0, hence the (now costly) campaign still prevails
when the environmental damage is perceived as limited.
2. for e 2 (etEmin; etEmax), we evaluate SW j=E vs SW jt=tE . We nd that the campaign is
more e¢ cient only when the quality ratio qH=qL is su¢ ciently high and its cost is not
too excessive; on the contrary, when qH=qL decreases (meaning that the environmental
quality of the brown good is not very di¤erent from that of the green good), there exists
a threshold value of e above which taxation is to be preferred, when s is su¢ ciently high.
3. for e 2 (etEmax; eEmax), we compare SW j=E with SW jt=tEmax , and nd the same results as
in the previous subinterval.
4. Finally, for e > eEmax, we nd that SW j=Emax > SW jt=tEmax when the quality ratio is high
and the cost of the campaign does not overcome a certain limit. Otherwise taxation is
more e¢ cient from the welfare standpoint.
(iii)bis When b > bb, then egEmin < 0 and etEmin < 0. Therefore:
(a) maxf0; eEmaxg < etEmax when s 2 (smin; es);
(b) etEmax < e
E
max when s > es:
In the rst subcase, the campaign is more e¢ cient than the taxation instrument. We nd that:
1. for e 2 (maxf0; eEmaxg; eEmax), algebraic calculations show that SW j=Emax > SW jt=tE :
2. for e > eEmax, SW j=Emax > SW jt=tEmax .
The result derives from the fact that the average evaluation of the environmental quality is
relatively high, meaning that consumers attach a high value to the environmental performance
of the product. Moreover, in this interval the cost to activate the campaign is relatively low.
In the second subcase, as one can easily guess after such a long exposition, we will nd similar
results as in the previous case, given that the cost for the campaign can be much higher than
before. In fact, we nd that:
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1. for e 2 (0; etEmax), we compare SW j=E with SW jt=tE and discover that, as in the
previous case (see subinterval 2), the campaign prevails when the quality ratio qH=qL is
su¢ ciently high and s is not too high. When qH=qL decreases, there exists a threshold
value of e above which taxation is to be preferred, provided the cost for the campaign s
is high enough.
2. For e 2 (etEmax; eEmax), we compare SW j=E with SW jt=tEmax ; we nd the same results as
in the previous subinterval.
3. Finally, for e > eEmax, we evaluate SW j=Emax vs. SW jt=tEmax and replicate the results
found in e 2 (0; eEmax) with the only di¤erence that, when the quality ratio is very low
and the cost of the campaign is su¢ ciently high, then taxation prevails for each value of
e > eEmax:
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